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Actavis, the Reverse Payment Fallacy, and
the Continuing Need for Regulatory
Solutions
Daniel A. Crane*
The Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.1
provided an incomplete and unsatisfying response to the issue
that has provoked far more antitrust scholarship than any
other in the past decade—patent settlements between branded
and generic drug companies where the branded makes a
“reverse payment” to the generic to stay off the market for
some period of time before the expiration of the branded’s
patent.2 In brief, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion rejected the
Eleventh Circuit’s standard under which settlements within
the patent’s exclusionary potential were presumed lawful.3 It
also rejected more draconian rules, like the per se illegal rule
adopted by the Sixth Circuit4 and the quick look approach
urged by the FTC.5 It opted instead for a rule of reason
analysis, where the defendant is free to show that the reverse
payment is a “rough approximation of the litigation expenses
© 2014 Daniel A. Crane
* Associate Dean for Faculty and Research and Frederick Paul Furth,
Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
2. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of 118 Law, Economics, and Business
Professors and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Petitioners at
11–12, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2233 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL
391001.
3. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38. In addition to the Circuit Court opinion
in FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom.
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), the Eleventh Circuit had followed
this rule in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir.
2005), and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2003).
4. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907–09 (6th Cir.
2003) (“There is simply no escaping the conclusion that the [reverse payment]
Agreement . . . was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate
competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United
States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”).
5. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
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saved through the settlement,” that the “payment may reflect
compensation for other services that the generic has promised
to perform,” or that the settlement was motivated by other
competitively benign considerations.6
The Actavis decision punted more than it decided.
Although narrowing the range of possible outcomes by rejecting
the legal rules at the extremes and opting for a rule of reason
middle ground, the opinion failed to grapple with the most
challenging
issues
of
regulatory
policy
raised
by
pharmaceutical patent settlements. In particular, it failed to
clearly delineate the social costs of permitting and disallowing
patent settlements, avoided grappling with the crucial issues of
patent validity and infringement, and erroneously focused on
“reverse payments” as a distinctive antitrust problem when
equally or more anticompetitive settlements can be crafted
without reverse payments.
Although Actavis is a frustrating opinion, it is perhaps too
much to expect judges to solve the patent settlements
challenge. As we enter the post-Actavis phase of antitrust
litigation over branded-generic settlements, it will become
increasingly clear that a comprehensive regulatory solution is
needed.
I.

THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PATENT SETTLEMENTS

For all of the complexity around the patent settlements
issue, a foundational observation regarding the social costs of
patent settlements is quite clear—making it all the more
frustrating that it is so frequently ignored. When a pioneer
drug company sues a generic entrant for patent infringement,
there is some probability, x, that the pioneer company will win
and obtain an injunction keeping the generic product off the
market until the expiration of the patent.7 (We can slightly
complicate the analysis by adding that a successful suit by the
pioneer may set a precedent that discourages other generics
from the market too).8 1 – x renders the remaining probability,
y, the chance that the pioneer company will lose the lawsuit

6. Id. at 2236.
7. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19
J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 91 (2005).
8. Cf. id. (assuming for purposes of the article’s analysis that no other
potential generic entrants exist).
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and that the generic product will enter before the patent
expires.9 If the generic product is forced to stay off the market
until the patent expires, the pioneer will be able to charge a
supracompetitive price, yielding a social loss of p, which
consists of just deadweight losses or deadweight losses plus
wealth transfers, depending on one’s denominational
persuasion.10 The social cost of patent settlements involving
delayed generic entry is yp, or the probability that (but for the
settlement) the generic would have entered times the monopoly
overcharge costs to society.11
The immediate implication of this bivariate social cost
formula is that one cannot assess the social costs of patent
settlements without some understanding of the probability of
generic entry absent the settlement. The Actavis majority
dismissed the need to understand the strength of the patent
invalidity or non-infringement defenses of the generic,12 relying
instead on evidence of what the economics of the settlement
might reveal about the branded firm’s intent.13 But, unlike the
probability of generic entry, the branded firm’s intent with
respect to the settlement is not a direct input into the social
cost equation. Indeed, it would only be relevant at all if it
revealed the pioneer’s implicit understanding of y. To be sure,
the economics of the settlement may reveal something about
the pioneer’s implicit understanding of y, but probably less
than the majority believed and certainly less than a direct
assessment of y.
In focusing on the subjective motivation for the settlement,
the Actavis majority appeared to suggest that any motivation
by the pioneer to eliminate y is inherently anticompetitive and
damning—what Learned Hand referred to in Alcoa as “caput

9. See id.
10. See id. at 83 (“[W]hen patents are improperly issued for rights that
are not novel, or are ‘obvious,’ the public suffers without justification by
paying supracompetitive prices.”).
11. Cf. Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent
Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L.
REV. 747, 754–55 (2002).
12. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (“[I]t is normally not
necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question . . . .”).
13. Id. at 2237 (“Although the parties may have reasons to prefer
settlements that include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust question is:
What are those reasons?”).
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lupinum” (the head of a wolf).14 This is an odd assumption and
one at odds with the ordinary operation of the rule of reason.
The motivation to suppress competition is often a small piece of
many business arrangements that easily satisfy the rule of
reason.15
Take, for example, the classic rule of reason case—Mitchel
v. Reynolds—which involved a bakehouse lease with a covenant
not to compete in the same parish for five years.16 It is certainly
conceivable that, absent the lease, the lessor and lessee would
have entered into competition within the relevant geographic
market. Each may have had some incentive to agree to the
lease in order to eliminate that possibility. But any elimination
of y in that case was swamped by the procompetitive effects of
the deal—that the lessee was apparently in a better position to
exploit the bakehouse assets than the lessor. These efficiencies
could not have been realized if the lessor had been able to recapture some of the bakery’s goodwill by opening a nearby
competitive facility.
Oddly, Actavis seemed to suggest that any residual trace of
insurance against y in a complex settlement agreement renders
the settlement anticompetitive as a whole. This approach
ignores that yp may be considerably smaller than the
procompetitive benefits of a settlement. As is well documented
in the literature, these include not only the elimination of
direct litigation costs, as the majority assumed,17 but many
others. Indirect litigation costs often exceed attorney’s and
expert witness fees.18 The early elimination of uncertainty
around generic entry can allow for better planning by both
pioneers and generics, and invention around the patent.19 The
settlement option increases the generic’s flexibility in
challenging the pioneer’s patent and hence decreases the costs
14. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir.
1945) (“[F]or not all that even a monopolist may earn is caput lupinum.”).
15. See Crane, supra note 11, at 778 (“A patentee’s intentions are
virtually always explicitly ‘anticompetitive’ in the precise sense in which
antitrust lawyers mean those words—the patentee wishes to suppress the
competition for its patented good in order to preserve a stream of monopoly
rents from that good.”).
16. Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (B.R.) 347; 1 P. Wms.
181, 181.
17. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
18. See Crane, supra note 11, at 757–58.
19. Id. at 762–63.
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of generic challenges.20 Many settlements allow for entry years
before the expiration of the patent, a possibility that would be
eliminated by the pioneer’s victory in the patent litigation.21 In
ordinary rule of reason analysis, one would analyze and weigh
these factors against yp, something the Actavis majority
seemed reluctant to permit.
II. CONCENTRATING ON THE DIRECTION OF PAYMENT
Like some courts and commentators before, the Actavis
majority saw something unnatural and inherently suspect in
reverse payments, observing that the reverse payment “form of
settlement is unusual.”22 But, as has been observed on many
occasions, the reverse payment form is a byproduct of the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s regulatory framework.23 Because of the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s automatic thirty-month stay of the
generic’s right to enter the market and the branded firm’s
obligation to file a patent challenge within forty-five days of a
generic company’s ANDA filing,24 the patent litigation usually
unfolds in a time period when the generic product will not yet
be on the market.25 Indeed, even if the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
20. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d
188, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing expert declaration of Dr. Jerry Hausman for
the proposition that “[t]o maximize these incentives [for generics to challenge
branded patents], a generic company should be permitted to choose not only
when to commence patent litigation, but also when to terminate it” (citation
omitted)).
21. See Michael A. Carrier, Provigil: A Case Study of Anticompetitive
Behavior, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 441, 442–44 (2011) (discussing early
entry provisions in agreements between pioneer and generic companies
regarding the medication Provigil, wherein the generic companies agreed in
2006 to delay market entry until 2012, when the patents were set to expire in
2015).
22. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013); see also id. at 2233
(“In the traditional examples cited above, a party with a claim (or
counterclaim) for damages receives a sum equal to or less than the value of its
claim. In reverse payment settlements, in contrast, a party with no claim for
damages (something that is usually true of a paragraph IV litigation
defendant) walks away with money simply so it will stay away from the
patentee’s market.”).
23. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A
Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 51 (2009)
(describing the increasing use of reverse payment settlements under the Act).
24. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
25. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements As Patent Invalidity Signals,
24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 293–94 (2011) (“[U]nlike usual patent litigation
where the dispute touches on products that are already on or about to enter
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automatic stay has lifted because of the expiration of the thirty
months or the denial of a preliminary injunction, the generic
may be reluctant to enter the market because of the asymmetry
between the damages the pioneer can collect in the event of
victory and the profits the generic can earn by marketing over
the same period. All of this means that, at the time most
pioneer-generic settlements occur, the branded has not yet
been injured by generic entry. It has no damages to demand
from the generic and any settlement payment in consideration
of the cessation of litigation must thus proceed from the
plaintiff to the defendant.26
The direction of payment in a patent settlement is only
roughly correlated with yp. It certainly is not a direct input,
which makes the concentration on the direction of payment a
sideshow to the important economic questions that should be
addressed. What’s worse, by focusing on reverse payments as a
distinctive issue requiring antitrust scrutiny, the Court ignored
the fact that equally or more anticompetitive patent
settlements can be constructed with no reverse payment at all,
as discussed next.
III. EASY ANTICOMPETITIVE WORK-AROUNDS
One of the factors that Justice Breyer identified as
supporting the legality of a reverse payment is evidence that
the “payment may reflect compensation for other services that
the generic has promised to perform—such as distributing the
patented item or helping to develop a market for that item.”27
He apparently has in mind a circumstance, true in some of the
patent settlement cases, where the generic agrees to distribute
either the branded drug or an authorized generic and receives a
promise of payment for its services as part of the settlement.
Indeed, if a generic and pioneer want to avoid the stigma of the
reverse payment altogether, it is simple to “naturalize” the
direction of payment by having the generic promise to pay the

the market, Hatch-Waxman litigation occurs prior to the generic drug actually
entering the market. Consequently, in the Hatch-Waxman litigation there are
no damages (other than the cost of litigation for each party) to be had. Yet
under a reverse settlement the patentee often pays amounts far exceeding the
cost of litigation to the challengers.”).
26. See id.; see also supra note 22.
27. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
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patentee for the right to be a distributor.28 Instead of an agency
model where the generic collects on behalf of the brand and
receives compensation for its efforts, the model can be reverted
to a licensing model where the generic is authorized to
distribute the drug, remitting some share of the proceeds to the
pioneer as a royalty.29 In that case, we have both the absence of
a reverse payment and the fact of early generic entry, which
should easily satisfy the Actavis rule of reason standard.
However, such agreements may be worse from a
competition standpoint than the reverse payments at issue in
Actavis.30 Suppose, for example, that prior to generic entry, the
monopoly mark-up per unit is equal to one dollar. Now suppose
that the pioneer brings a patent infringement lawsuit with a
low probability of success. Prior to adjudication of that lawsuit,
the pioneer settles with the generic, making the generic its
authorized generic distributor. The generic agrees to remit to
the pioneer a royalty of one dollar per unit sale. Unless the
generic’s marginal costs of production or distribution are lower
than that of the pioneer, we now have (1) early generic entry;
(2) no reverse payment; and (3) a continuation of precisely the
previous monopoly pricing.
Indeed, if the licensing agreement continues until the
expiration of the patent, this scenario may be worse than some
reverse payment settlements, particularly those that permit
generic entry before the expiration of the patent. Further, we
need not make the royalty equal to the full monopoly
overcharge in order to produce anticompetitive results. Say the
royalty is equal to 90% of the monopoly overcharge. Now, in
addition to early generic entry and no reverse payment, we
have the delightful bonus of immediate price reductions. But
there is still potentially an enormous anticompetitive effect.
Since the first generic to market ordinarily sets its price
around 70%–80% of the brand,31 this settlement deprives
28. See Crane, supra note 11, at 765.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 765–66.
31. See Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition
in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS, 1991, at 1, 35 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford
Winston eds., 1991) (“[G]eneric drugs sell for a substantial discount from the
price of the branded drug; the estimates suggest that with a single generic
entrant, the generic price is roughly 60 percent of the branded drug price.”);
David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV.
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consumers of a much larger price decrease they might have
received in the but-for world.
This example is not fanciful. The FDA currently lists 673
authorized generics on the market.32 To the extent that these
agreements do not involve reverse payments, they will not
show up on the post-Actavis radar screen. But every antitrust
lawyer worth his or her salt will be pushing clients in the
direction of settlements of this nature that avoid reverse
payments. Circumvention of the reverse payment rule
established in Actavis is relatively easy.
To repeat an earlier point, what drives yp is not the
direction in which payment flows in a patent settlement. It is
the probability that but for the settlement, the generic and
pioneer would have entered into price competition. There are
ample means other than reverse payments to soften
competition between branded and generic drug firms. Actavis
does not merely ignore this possibility. By crediting licensing
agreements as a robustly procompetitive defense, it compounds
the error of the decision and appears to grant categorical
immunity to other forms of anticompetitive agreement.
IV. THE CONTINUING NEED FOR REGULATORY
SOLUTIONS
Actavis represents another instance of what my colleague
Becky Eisenberg has called “patent punting” strategies—
refusals by courts to engage with the strength of patents in
cases other than patent infringement cases. It is
understandable that judges prefer to treat patents as black
boxes rather than to engage their merits. After all, patent is
such a specialized and technical area of law that it is the one of
the very few for which we have created a specialized court of
appeals. Relitigating in the antitrust case the full merits of the

ECON. & STAT. 37, 44 (2005) (explaining that their study showed a single
generic entrant would set its price at 88% of the branded price); see also Caves
et al., supra, at 44–45 (finding that generic producers depress the branded
drug’s price and “enter the market quoting prices much lower than those of
their branded competitors”).
32. FDA Listing of Authorized Generics as of July 22, 2013, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/
OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/UCM183605.pdf (last visited Aug.
28, 2013).
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previously settled patent infringement litigation is a burden
that neither the parties nor the courts wish to undertake.
But the fact that the undertaking is burdensome is not a
good reason to eschew it if it provides one of the two necessary
inputs to understanding whether the settlement is harmful to
consumer welfare.33 Unless we can determine y just by
deconstructing the settlement economics—something far more
difficult than the Actavis court seemed to assume—there is no
substitute for direct engagement with the strength of the
patent infringement claim, meaning both the patent validity
and the defendant’s non-infringement defense.
To say that there needs to be direct engagement with the
strength of the patent infringement claim is not to say that
courts need to do this. The analytical and practical gaps in
Actavis point to the need for a greater degree of regulatory
involvement in branded-generic contestation over patent
rights. One could imagine a range of regulatory actors that
already touch aspects of these problems—the PTO, FDA, or
FTC, for example—playing a greater role in opening the black
box of the patent infringement claim and hence providing
information more directly relevant to the antitrust analysis
than the direction of the settlement payment.
Actavis showed the courts grappling for solutions they are
ill-equipped to provide. As the next wave of antitrust litigation
around patent settlements unfolds in coming years and the
vulnerability of courts in answering the relevant questions
becomes more apparent, the need for regulatory solutions will
become clearer. The door should now be opened for creative
proposals for regulatory solutions.

33. Indeed, one might say that y is the crucial input, since it can
reasonably be assumed that p will be large given economic evidence on the
price reduction patterns upon generic entry. See Caves et al., supra note 31, at
44–45.
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